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The environmental state and the glass ceiling of
transformation
Daniel Hausknost
Institute for Social Change and Sustainability (IGN), Vienna University of Economics and
Business, Vienna, Austria
ABSTRACT
What are the capacities of the state to facilitate a comprehensive sustainability
transition? It is argued that structural barriers akin to an invisible ‘glass ceiling’ are
inhibiting any such transformation. First, the structure of state imperatives does not
allow for the addition of an independent sustainability imperative without major
contradictions. Second, the imperative of legitimation is identiﬁed as a crucial
component of the glass ceiling. A distinction is introduced between ‘lifeworld’
and ‘system’ sustainability, showing that the environmental state has created an
environmentally sustainable lifeworld, which continues to be predicated on
a fundamentally unsustainable reproductive system. While this ‘decoupling’ of
lifeworld from system sustainability has alleviated legitimation pressure from the
state, a transition to systemic sustainability will require deep changes in the life-
world. This constitutes a renewed challenge for state legitimation. Some specula-
tions regarding possible futures of the environmental state conclude the article.
KEYWORDS Environmental state; transformation; sustainability; decoupling; transition barriers; legitimation
Introduction
In the ﬁrst half century of its existence, the environmental state has pursued
a rather selective agenda: in the domestic realm, many of its activities and
measures have been impressively eﬀective, resulting in the maintenance or
improvement of environmental quality in several advanced industrialised
countries – notably in Western Europe – despite enormous increases of
economic activity. On the systemic level of the global biosphere, however,
environmental states around the world have not reduced but massively
increased the negative impact of their production and consumption activities
(Steﬀen et al. 2015, Fritz and Koch 2016). That way, citizens of many environ-
mental states have come to enjoy both, a relatively safe, healthy and clean
environment as well as a lifestyle of high consumption, mobility and material
abundance that proves to be spectacularly unsustainable. Thus, the state seems
to have fulﬁlled a double function of protecting many of its citizens from direct
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environmental harm and of protecting their material standard of living (with
numerous problems of environmental inequality and injustice still remaining);
but it has failed so far to alleviate those environmental burdens that are
dispersed in time and space and whose negative eﬀects are mediated through
several ecosystemic feedback loops (Raymond 2004). The prime example of
that category of burden is the emission of greenhouse gases, which usually do
not harm anyone at the source directly, but whose negative eﬀects return to the
emitter (and everyone else) with long delays in the form of potentially cata-
strophic climate change. Other (and systemically related) examples include the
rapid loss of biodiversity, the acidiﬁcation of the oceans and the derailment of
the global cycles of nitrogen and phosphorus (Rockström et al. 2009).
However, it is these global and systemic environmental consequences of
human activity that pose the greatest challenge to humanity today and that
may become a matter of survival for our species (Hamilton 2010). It becomes
ever more apparent that meeting this challenge will require substantial societal
transformations that go deeper than the securing of environmental quality in
wealthy societies or the relative decoupling of environmental impact from
economic growth. Instead, a near complete elimination of fossil carbon from
human activity and a massive reduction of overall environmental throughput
are required. Consequently, states today are chargedwith the task of facilitating
what is variously called a low-carbon transition, sustainability transition or
socio-ecological transformation of society (Foxon 2011, Geels 2011, Haberl et al.
2011). The important question to ask is thus whether they have the capacity
and ability to initiate and steer transformations of that kind or if their trans-
formative capacities are structurally constrained to a certain type of environ-
mental reform that is unlikely to bring about deep socio-ecological change. Put
diﬀerently, what are the chances of the real existing environmental state to
develop into a fully-ﬂedged ‘sustainable’ or ‘green’ state that makes the socio-
ecological transformation of society one of its core imperatives and that has the
means, capacity and legitimacy to carry out this role? Does the green state
logically follow from the environmental state in terms of a gradual intensiﬁca-
tion or expansion of its eco-political agenda, or is there a more fundamental
barrier between the two, a categorical diﬀerence that rules out that sort of
developmental logic? Finally, has the environmental state so far perhaps even
helped to entrench and sustain a type of society that is fundamentally unsus-
tainable? What, then, would be the prospect of a purposive socioecological
transformation to occur?
I aim to show that the further transformation of the environmental state is
indeed curtailed by an invisible yet eﬀective structural barrier that I call the
‘glass ceiling of transformation’. I use the ‘glass ceiling’ metaphor outside of its
original context, where it denotes a set of ‘barriers to the advancement of
minorities and women within corporate hierarchies’ (U.S. Glass Ceiling
Commission 1995). Like in the original context, the metaphor here refers to
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a type of barrier that is invisible, unacknowledged and without legitimation.
Whereas the original usage of the term connotes the structural consequences of
gendered or racialized forms of power, however, the glass ceiling of socio-
ecological transformation, I contend, has its origin at the level of the very
structures of the modern state itself, which emerged in tandem with and as the
institutional vessel of the fossil energy system.
The glass ceiling I aim to describe here is not absolute in terms of numbers
such as tons of greenhouse gas emissions or species lost. Rather, it imposes
a certain trajectory of change and inhibits other forms of change that might be
necessary for structural transformation to happen. The glass ceiling should thus
be understood as a systemboundary thatmay be shiftedwithin certain dynamic
parameters but not transgressed without ﬁrst changing the underlying struc-
ture and identity of the system itself. I explore the glass ceiling of transforma-
tion in three steps. In the next section, I rebut the widespread assumption in the
literature on the environmental state that a further greening of the state were
possible through the emergence of a ‘sustainability imperative’. In section three,
I develop the argument that the glass ceiling is associated with problems of state
legitimation leading to a systemic separation of ‘lifeworld’ from ‘system’ sus-
tainability. Section four substantiates the concept of the glass ceiling in more
empirical-historical terms, while the concluding section speculates about ways
to overcome the glass ceiling of transformation.
The impossibility of a ‘sustainability imperative’
In past decades, environmental management and conservation policy have
entered the core of state activity in advanced industrial democracies.
Environmental management today ‘is recognised as a fundamental part of
what a civilized state should do’ (Meadowcroft 2012, p. 67). This recent
transformation of the modern state is interpreted as the emergence of the
‘environmental state’ (Mol and Buttel 2002, Duit et al. 2016), which Duit et al.
(2016, p. 5–6) deﬁne as ‘a state that possesses a signiﬁcant set of institutions
and practices dedicated to the management of the environment and societal-
environmental interactions’, like environmental ministries and agencies, fra-
mework environmental laws and dedicated budgets.
Scholars tend to draw a distinction between the empirically existing ‘envir-
onmental state’ and what they variously call the ‘green state’, ‘eco state’ or
‘sustainability state’ (Eckersley 2004, Meadowcroft 2005, Heinrichs and Laws
2014). While the former describes an immanent response of the state to
environmental pressures within its territory, the green state is a normative-
prescriptive concept exploring the possibility of a state that actively facilitates
a societal transition toward strong and comprehensive ecological sustainabil-
ity, including the possibility of granting precedence to ecological sustainability
over economic growth. Crucially, the green state ‘must be concerned explicitly
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with keeping patterns of consumption and production within ecological limits’
(Meadowcroft 2005, p. 5, original emphasis), and thus with realigning its entire
socioeconomic activity with some absolute material boundaries. While the
environmental state has been focusing on greening the ‘supply side’ of capit-
alism by seeking ‘more environmentally eﬃcient ways of expanding output’,
the green state would need to tackle the ‘demand side’ to reduce the ﬂows of
energy and matter that are being processed and consumed (Barry and
Eckersley 2005, p. 262). This would most probably involve interfering with
deeply engrained notions of consumer sovereignty, choice, lifestyles and iden-
tities, and constitute ‘a challenge that no state or society has adequately even
begun to address’ (Barry and Eckersley 2005, p. 262).
It may come as a surprise, then, that much of the scholarship on the
environmental state deems possible the gradual transformation of the envir-
onmental state into a more comprehensively green state or eco-state, which
would make a socioecological transformation of society one of its core func-
tions (Meadowcroft 2012; e.g. Dryzek et al. 2003). The green state, these
authors seem to suggest, could evolve out of the environmental state: ‘If the
maxim of the ﬁrst phase of the environmental state was “clean up pollution and
protect the environment”, and that of the second phase has been “promote
sustainable development”, then the new motto needs to be something like
“transform societal practices to respect ecological limits”’ (Meadowcroft 2012,
p. 77). Scholars adhering to this evolutionary model of the green state tend to
base their argument on the concept of ‘state imperatives’, which they derive
from historical institutionalism (Skocpol 1979, Tilly 2009), and from post-
Marxist state theory (e.g. Oﬀe 1984). Dryzek et al. deﬁne state imperatives ‘as
the functions that governmental structures have to carry out to ensure their
own longevity and stability (2002, p. 662–663)’. Historical institutionalists have
identiﬁed three imperatives that characterized the early modern, absolutist
state: to keep internal order, to defend against external threats and to raise the
resources to ﬁnance these ﬁrst two tasks (2002, p. 662). Since then, the modern
state underwent two major transformations, each of which was associated with
the addition of another imperative.
First, with the rise of the bourgeoisie and its growing economic base, the
imperative of economic growth (or accumulation) emerged and transformed
the absolutist into the liberal capitalist state. The second transformation came
in reaction to the struggles of an organised working class, which threatened to
undermine the stability of the state. Thus, the liberal capitalist state was forced
to democratise and to provide social welfare ‘to cushion the working class
against the dislocations of capitalism’(2002, p. 662). The resulting democratic
welfare state is associated with another, ﬁfth, imperative, which post-Marxists
(e.g. Oﬀe 1984) call the imperative of (democratic) legitimation. Legitimation
here means that under conditions of universal suﬀrage the state – and in
particular, the elected legislative and executive powers – are accountable to
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the entire citizenry and need to further some kind of publicly mediated
common good that exceeds the narrowly deﬁned interests of private capital
accumulation. Meadowcroft et al. (2012, p. 6), accordingly, call it the ‘electoral
politics imperative’. Together, these ﬁve imperatives – domestic order, external
competition, revenue, economic growth and legitimation – deﬁne the core of
the modern democratic welfare state.
This narrative of a gradual evolution of the state is attractive to scholars of
the green state as it suggests the possibility of a further transformation through
the addition of yet another state imperative. In their book Green States and
Social Movements (2003), Dryzek et al. argue that the addition of new impera-
tives has always been the result of social classes or movements struggling for
inclusion in the state. They were successful to the extent that they were able to
link their ‘deﬁning interest’ to an existing state imperative – such as the
bourgeoisie linking their interest in proﬁt accumulation to the imperative of
state revenue and the working class aligning their interest in economic inclu-
sion with the bourgeois imperative of accumulation. Consequently, Dryzek
et al. (2002, p. 679) speculate that ‘an emerging connection of environmental
values to both economic and legitimation imperatives to constitute a green
state with a conservation imperative could constitute a development on a par
with two prior transformations of the modern state’ (emphasis added). They
base their hope on the empirical observation that environmental movements
have already been able to push the capitalist welfare state to incorporate some
core environmental tasks into its structure and to evolve into the environ-
mental state. But does this observation warrant any conﬁdence in its further
transformation into a fully-ﬂedged green state? I see two fundamental pro-
blems with this idea:
First, the logic of state imperatives is cumulative and does not permit
fundamental contradictions. A new imperative can be added to the existing
structure only if it can be made compatible with it in that its operation can be
reconciled with the operation of the others. The accumulation imperative
could be attached to the pre-existing state structure despite its revolutionary
potential that enthroned the bourgeoisie and ended feudal rule, because it was
ultimately reinforcing the pre-existing state imperatives through the genera-
tion of revenue. Likewise, the legitimation imperative could be added despite
its disruptive potential precisely because and to the extent that it could be
operationalized in a way that helped reproduce the conditions of accumulation
(e.g. the Fordist welfare regime). Previous transformations of the state thus
expanded state functions rather than replacing them. Accordingly, Gough
(2016) speaks of a ‘layering’ rather than a transformation of state functions
in that new functions are layered on top of pre-existing ones, amalgamating
with them to form a new overall identity of the state. Importantly, the historical
expansion of state functions through the layering of imperatives has invariably
expanded and accelerated societies’ metabolism, that is, their throughput of
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(fossil) energy and natural resources (Krausmann et al. 2018). While the rise of
the accumulation imperative was associated with the Industrial Revolution and
thus with the age of coal, the legitimation imperative has been intimately tied to
the age of oil and gas, which took oﬀ with the normalisation of consumerism
and automobility in the democratic welfare state (Mitchell 2011, Pichler et al.
2020). Since the late 1940s, the Fordist mode of welfare capitalism (Aglietta
1979) has led to the ‘Great Acceleration’ of energy and resource use in
industrialised countries, which some argue marks the beginning of the
Anthropocene (Steﬀen et al. 2015). Ever since, the social metabolism of
democratic welfare states has remained on a dramatically unsustainable level,
which no environmental policy so far has been able signiﬁcantly to reduce
(Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017). The modern state has arguably co-evolved with
the fossil energy system in that the availability of cheap, dense, abundant and
readily available energy carriers was a precondition for both prior transforma-
tions of the state (Mitchell 2011, Hausknost 2017b).
Any putative sustainability imperative to be added would have to revert the
historical trajectory of socio-metabolic expansion without entering into blatant
contradiction with the existing imperative structure. It would have to pursue
a near total decarbonisation of modern society, the halting of rapid biodiversity
loss and the realignment of critical planetary biogeochemical systems without at
the same time inhibiting the imperative of accumulation and the legitimation
function of the democratic welfare state. Strategies of economic degrowth,
suﬃciency, and frugality, on the other hand, would tend to openly contradict
the functional requirements of the state, as measures that lead to reductions in
consumption, production and – by implication – employment and state revenue
are toxic for all but the sustainability imperative (Hausknost 2017a).
To be sure, the cumulative structure of imperatives rarely works in perfect
harmony, but is subject to the frequent emergence of partially contradictory
developments, like the contradiction between the ﬁnancially expansive legit-
imation imperative and the revenue imperative (which is one of Oﬀe’s
‘Contradictions of the Welfare State’ (1984)). These latent internal contra-
dictions, however, are usually controlled and reconciled ‘through various
adaptive mechanisms of the system’ (Oﬀe 1984, p. 133) that are rooted in
democratic parliamentarianism and in corporatist bargaining structures.
However, these adaptive mechanisms would cease to work if one imperative
fundamentally obstructed (one of) the others: while the legitimation imperative
ultimately enhanced accumulation despite secular tensions and could thus be
added to the structure, an imperative geared toward a shrinking economic
system based on principles of suﬃciency and frugality, for example, might
constitute a fundamental contradiction that is not reconcilable with the pre-
existing structure.
This ﬁrst approximation of the glass ceiling of transformation thus reveals
a rather rigid and narrow corridor of change a sustainability imperative
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would have to navigate: it would inescapably have to remain within the
paradigm of ecological modernization, which seeks to environmentally
reform and optimize the processes of accumulation without disrupting or
slowing them (Mol et al. 2010). The only available strategy of reducing the
systemic unsustainability of society’s metabolism within this paradigm is the
attempt to ‘decouple’ economic growth from environmental impact by
further increasing the resource and energy eﬃciency of the economy
(UNEP 2011, Ward et al. 2016). In a growth-based system, however, eﬀorts
of decoupling underlie intractable rebound eﬀects which have so far largely
prevented an absolute decoupling of systemic parameters like carbon emis-
sions and ecological footprints from production and consumption activities
(Herring and Sorrell 2009, Fritz and Koch 2016). Indeed, there is accumulat-
ing evidence that an absolute decoupling of environmental impact from
a growing economy at the pace required to achieve relevant sustainability
goals is empirically not observable and theoretically implausible (Kemp-
Benedict 2018, Schandl et al. 2018). The concept of an additional ‘sustain-
ability imperative’ therefore remains intimately tied to the empirical reality
of the environmental state with its limited transformative potential. Any
deviation from this path would be likely to destabilize the very structure of
the modern state.
The argument so far has certain similarities with the theory of the ‘treadmill of
production’ (Schnaiberg 1980, Schnaiberg et al. 2002), which equally posits that
the imperative of economic growth in capitalist societies structurally prevents
a substantive transformation towards sustainability. However, the political econ-
omy of the treadmill grants explanatory priority to the logic of the ﬁrm, proﬁt
interests and power elites. It is concerned with a broadly Marxist conception of
the accumulation imperative driving the treadmill and with corporate interests
preventing a real greening of society. The theory of the glass ceiling put forward
here, by contrast, assumes a somewhat more complicated relationship between
the imperative of accumulation and that of legitimation. While the treadmill’s
explanatory logic is that of capital and thus production, the glass ceiling takes into
account the legitimating and stabilizing function of high levels of consumption,
and thus a structural tendency of modern societies (capitalist or otherwise) to
develop a social metabolism that is ecologically unsustainable. There is
a complicity of the accumulation and legitimation functions in the modern
state, which blurs the convenient distinction between capital interests and
‘society’. While acknowledging the role of vested interests and incumbent (fossil)
power elites in inhibiting deep socio-ecological change, the glass ceiling perspec-
tive put forward here suggests an even deeper relationship of industrial societies
with structural unsustainability that has to do with patterns of state legitimation
requiring high levels of material welfare and an orientation toward economic
growth. Put diﬀerently, getting rid of existing power elites alone would not
necessarily lead to an ecologically more sustainable society.
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My second objection to the possibility of a strong sustainability imperative is
a logical implication of the ﬁrst. I contend that within the logic of cumulative
state imperatives it is implausible to assume that there could be any new
addition of imperatives beyond that of democratic legitimation. Instead, the
logic of imperatives is completed with that of legitimation, since legitimation is
the form that subsumes all conceivable contents in terms of particular social
demands. Put diﬀerently, any new social movement or demand on the state
would have to be voiced through the imperative of legitimation and would
ultimately remain a function of legitimation. As I will argue below, the emer-
gence of the environmental state in the second half of the 20th century was an
eﬀect of the state’s legitimation imperative and not the sign of a new, indepen-
dent imperative to emerge. The environmental agenda of the contemporary
state is a response to legitimation pressures and to growing risks with regard to
continued accumulation.Within the self-referential logic of state imperatives, it
can have no external point of reference that would bind the state to a certain
behavior. The crucial question then becomes to what extent the legitimation
imperative itself functions as a source or an inhibitor of transformative change .
It is to this question that we now turn.
Locating the glass ceiling: lifeworld and system sustainability
In order to conceptualize the glass ceiling of transformation, I rely on an
analytical distinction between lifeworld and system sustainability, in a loose
analogy with the original Habermasian distinction (Habermas 1988). The
phenomenological concept of the lifeworld captures a ‘pre-theoretical, subjec-
tively constituted world of perception’ (Dietz 1993, p. 20, my translation). It is
the world of praxis, of the everyday, of the perceptible. The lifeworld is the
realm where the intersubjective construction of meaning, culture and identity
takes place within a material world of experience; it is the individual’s horizon
of relevant action and communication (cf. Husserl 1954). Thus, the lifeworld is
our material and cultural habitat, so to speak. Legitimation crises, Habermas
points out, are always crises of the lifeworld. They occur when the textures of
meaning, identity and institutional routine become ruptured. The lifeworld is
thus the relevant domain of action for state legitimation.
In a conscious deviation from the established meaning of sustainability,
I therefore propose to deﬁne lifeworld sustainability (LWS) as a subjectively
desirable and comfortable state of the lifeworld. This typically involves the
dimension of material abundance and well-being (often represented through
monetary income and opportunities for consumption and individual mobi-
lity), as well as the dimensions of social security and cultural stability,
including the typical health, education and social insurance provisions of
a modern welfare state and the sustained reproduction of patterns of culture
and identity. But it may also include, as we will see, aspects of environmental
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quality like clean air and water, safe and aﬀordable food, the absence of toxic
substances in the immediate lifeworld and suﬃciently large and diverse
stretches of preserved ‘nature’ for recreational purposes. Finally, LWS also
requires a sense of moral and rational consistency of the intersubjective
structures of meaning, that is, the sense that the desirable lifeworld can and
should be sustained.
System sustainability (SYS), by contrast, refers to the objective biophysical
planetary conditions under which a given socio-economic regime can be
sustained in the long run. SYS would be achieved, for example, if the climate
goal of keeping global warming below 1.5°C by 2100 were achieved, the rate of
global biodiversity loss reduced to a level near the pre-industrial background
rate, oceanic acidiﬁcation halted and the social metabolism of industrial socie-
ties downsized to ﬁt within the known ‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockström et al.
2009) of human activity in the biosphere. The system in this deﬁnition denotes
the complex biophysical interactions that connect socioeconomic activities on
all scales with natural processes on the planetary level, such as the climate,
water, nitrogen, phosphorus and other cycles (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017). In
a deliberate deviation from the Habermasian distinction of lifeworld and
system, SYS here denotes the sustainability of the biospherewithin scientiﬁcally
and ethically deﬁned parameters that ensure the long-term survival of human-
kind without further signiﬁcant losses of non-human species beyond back-
ground rates.
The analytical distinction between LWS and SYS oﬀered here serves to
elucidate the functional logic of the environmental state and its limits. LWS
and SYS are systemically related in a way that pushes the state to enact certain
forms of change while avoiding others. Let me brieﬂy sketch their relationship:
● LWS is the politically decisive dimension, whereas SYS is the ecologically
decisive one (at least on a planetary scale). Since the democratization of the
capitalist state and its transformation into the democratic welfare state,
state legitimation has been dependent to a large degree on governments’
ability to improve the living conditions of the electorate and thus to
improve and enrich their lifeworld (Oﬀe 1984). Environmental issues
become politically salient to the extent that they become visible as a threat
to the electorate’s lifeworld. SYS, by contrast, is a scientiﬁc and ethical
standard that does not as such have any political weight.
● Systemic unsustainability becomes politically salient only if and when it
encroaches upon the lifeworld, that is, when its eﬀects endanger LWS. In
that sense, the increasingly noticeable eﬀects of climate change in the
lifeworld of citizens may lead to a certain empowerment of the envir-
onmental state to take action beyond the status quo.
● However, state action in pursuit of SYS that would itself negatively aﬀect
LWS, for example in terms of loss of social security, income or
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opportunities for employment, consumption and mobility, is blocked
through the state’s functional allegiance to LWS. This means: if environ-
mental action does not improve but in fact deteriorate the subjective
quality of the citizens’ lifeworld, it is politically very unlikely to be taken.
● Consequently, the state can pursue SYS only in accordance with its
functional commitment to LWS, that is, in a way that is perceived as
a relative improvement of the lifeworld and not as a deterioration thereof.
● To the extent that the pursuit of SYS requires transformative action that
would be perceived as a threat to the quality of their lifeworld by
substantial parts of the electorate, state action is severely curtailed.
Hence the glass ceiling of transformation.
The upshot of this logic is that the standards of SYS have no direct relevance for
state action, if they are not in accordance with the existing imperatives of the
state. Only when they are mediated through the lifeworld can they mobilize
state action under the legitimation imperative. State action pursuing SYS but
contradicting LWS is highly improbable.
This reading suggests that the environmental state emerged as a systemic
eﬀect of the legitimation imperative in response to environmental pressures in
the lifeworld and that it remains functionally tied to the logic of legitimation and
not of ‘objective’ SYS. As a result of pressure from environmental movements
and thewider public sphere, the state started to alleviate the legitimation pressure
from the environmental lifeworld domain by erecting the institutional infra-
structure to combat problems like air and water pollution, forest dieback, toxic
chemicals in the food chain and other ‘environmental hazards’. In doing so, it
saved the quality of the lifeworld of many citizens from further degradation or
even improved it from a previously degraded state – without at the same time
reducing economic expansion, material aﬄuence and consumption opportu-
nities. The state saved the industrial lifeworld by environmentally reforming it.
This portrayal of the environmental state’s successes in sanitizing its citizens’
lifeworld, however, should not be read as an attempt to gloss over the persisting
inequalities in the distribution of environmental burdens within industrialised
countries. States never improved everybody’s lifeworld – there are numerous
instances where environmental risks have been shifted to poor neighborhoods,
communities of colour or indigenous communities, notably in North America
(Martínez Alier 2002). The overall strategy of the environmental state, however,
was to release legitimation pressure by improving the environmental quality of
the lifeworld of strategically relevant segments of society.
At the same time, the contribution of environmentally reformed industrial
societies to systemic unsustainability continuously increased – in the form of
greenhouse gas emissions, total resource and energy use and contributions to
deforestation and biodiversity loss in other parts of the world. The systemic
unsustainability of industrial societies had been gradually ‘decoupled’ from the
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sustainability of their lifeworld in that the state ‘greened’ domestic production
while at the same time fostering consumption and economic expansion. The
carbon emissions, deforestation, ocean acidiﬁcation etc. that is caused by
domestic consumption does not negatively aﬀect the industrial lifeworld – to
the contrary, it is the invisible and intangible side eﬀect of what is considered an
integral and indispensable part of a modern lifeworld. The seemingly para-
doxical consequence is that the environmental state has entrenched and for-
tiﬁed the systemic unsustainability of industrial capitalism in that it separated
the trajectories of LWS and SYS.
Underneath the glass ceiling: stages of the environmental state
Building on the historical periodization suggested in Meadowcroft (2012),
I propose the following model, consisting of three stages of the environmental
state (see Table 1). While stage 1 focused on the securing of LWS and was
characterized by policies of pollution control, stage 2 was characterized by the
attempt to tackle systemic unsustainability bymeans that were compatible with
accumulation and legitimation. That stage saw a marked decoupling of the
trajectories of LWS and SYS and could be characterized as ‘living well in an
unsustainable world’. The third stage, which has arguably just begun, is
dedicated to the transition toward SYS; it is at this stage that the environmental
state appears to hit the glass ceiling of its transformative potential.
Stage I: pollution control
In the 1960s, after two decades of explosive economic growth, the environ-
mental consequences of the newly established consumer society started to
backlash on many citizens’ lifeworld. Phenomena like forest dieback, poi-
soned rivers, smog and toxins in the food and water supply made the sense of
progress turn sour and became acute legitimation problems for democratic
states. In a climate of anti-systemic critique pervading that decade, the
environmental movement emerged as a political force, building on the
Table 1. Three stages of the environmental state.
Environmental
State Agenda Focus Domain Outcome
Stage I
c. 1965–1990
Pollution control Lifeworld Success: lifeworld sustainability
System challenges evaded
Stage II
c. 1990–2010
Sustainable
development
Lifeworld
(+ System)
Entrenched lifeworld-sustainability;
decoupling of lifeworld from system;
system challenges tackled ineﬀectively
Stage III
c. 2010-
Socio-ecological
transformation
(System) Glass ceiling; only such action possible that
does not revert lifeworld sustainability;
transition inhibited
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perceptible phenomena of ecological decay to launch a much broader attack
on capitalist industrialism as such, which it perceived as self-destructive and
unsustainable (cf. Dryzek et al. 2003, p. 58). The states thus challenged
responded in a way that aimed at alleviating legitimation pressure: they
enacted a wave of environmental legislation dealing with environmental
problems in the lifeworld like air and water pollution; they built up the
institutional capacity to manage these problems in the long-term und thus
started to erect the environmental state. The focus was on pollution control
and environmental management through technological solutions and regu-
lation (Fiorino 2011, Meadowcroft 2012). The success of this ﬁrst phase was
signiﬁcant: within two decades, the lifeworld of industrial societies was
ecologically sanitized and refurbished to a large degree. The state showed
that it could deal with environmental burdens and that such problems are
solvable within a growth-based capitalist society. The result was a lifeworld
experience that contained and uniﬁed both, a consumerist and expansive
economic model and a relatively clean, safe and healthy environment. Issues
of systemic unsustainability were still present in the public sphere in debates
on the ‘Limits to Growth’ (Meadows et al. 1974) or the ‘Gaia hypothesis’
(Lovelock 1979), but the state’s success in ‘greening’ the lifeworld managed
to disconnect them from the legitimation pressures of the lifeworld. That
way, the systemic dimension of sustainability became ever more depoliti-
cized, as its links to the lifeworld of citizens weakened and as managerial
environmentalism proved its ability to change things for the better. In line
with this process, many environmental movement organisations switched
their focus from systemic to lifeworld environmental issues, where they
could gain popular and political inﬂuence in solving concrete environmental
problems (van der Heijden 1997). Their role changed from being the intel-
lectual vanguard of a systemic critique of industrial capitalism, to gaining
and utilizing expert knowledge for environmental reforms. Political inﬂu-
ence and inclusion into the new environmental state could only be gained by
oﬀering solutions to real-world problems; or, as a German federal oﬃcial of
the time put it, ‘[t]o have a reasonable concern means to have a proposal to
solve a real problem’ (quoted in Dryzek et al. 2003, p. 85).
Stage II: sustainable development
Systemic challenges did not disappear, however. During the 1980s, the issue of
anthropogenic climate change emerged on the agenda, pictures of burning rain
forests and stories about holes in the ozone layer unsettled the public and the
nuclear disaster of Chernobyl suggested that the ecological and technological
risks of modernity were increasing despite healthy-looking local environments
(Beck 1992). The state had to act, but without risking the loss of economic
growth or negative impacts on the lifeworld of citizens. Backed by their
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successes in achieving LWS, states started to frame the systemic challenges as
civilizational problems of a planetary scale that need to be solved by all of
humanity and all parts of society together. The paradigm of sustainable
development (WCED 1987, UN 1993) was launched as an ethical imperative
that should guide all activities on the planet, but it was by no means a state
imperative with functional powers.
States created a range of ‘new environmental policy instruments’ (NEPIs)
stimulating environmental innovation, resource eﬃciency and public educa-
tion (Jordan et al. 2003). As curtailing consumer choice and economic growth
was not an option, they relied on strategies of voluntariness, incentives and
innovation, with some elements of taxation in the mix. A particular emphasis
was given to market-based instruments and voluntary labelling schemes that
oﬀered environmentally conscious consumers an ‘informed choice’. That way,
niche markets for organic and other eco-products emerged as an addition to
conventional, lower-priced products. Environmental non-governmental orga-
nisations (NGOs) were increasingly involved in the participatory practices of
environmental governance, which collectivized responsibility across the public,
private and state domains (Hysing 2015). The overall strategic approach of this
era of ‘sustainable development’was that of ecologicalmodernisation, based on
the belief that industrial modernity as such can be made ecologically sustain-
able in line with economic growth through means of institutional, technolo-
gical and market innovation (Mol et al. 2010).
A quick look at empirical data suggests that the entire era of sustainable
development achieved very little in solving the problems of systemic unsus-
tainability, however. While pollutants with immediate and regional impact
followed the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) and declined with rising
economic prosperity (Stern 2004, Raymond 2004), ‘systemic’ indicators like
greenhouse gas emissions or the ecological footprint per capita could at best
be relatively decoupled from economic growth or even continued to grow
monotonically with prosperity (Fritz and Koch 2016, Schandl et al. 2018).
What has been decoupled in absolute terms, instead, was the environmental
quality of citizens’ lifeworld from the ecological state of the earth system.
Environmental risks, as Kirk Smith has famously shown, have historically
transitioned up from the household via the community to the global scale
(Smith and Ezzati 2005), where they no longer constitute a direct legitima-
tion problem for the state. To use a stark metaphor, citizens of advanced
industrialized democracies have increasingly come to be cossetted like
embryos in a womb, supplied and ‘tele-coupled’ (Lenschow et al. 2016)
with unsustainable levels of fossil energy and natural resources through the
umbilical cord of world trade. This externalization of the burdens of systemic
unsustainability from the own lifeworld to lifeworlds in other parts of the
planet has been identiﬁed as the key mechanism of an ‘imperial mode of
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living’ that has characterised the era of ‘sustainable development’ in
advanced industrial democracies (Brand and Wissen 2018, Lessenich 2019).
Stage III: socio-ecological transformation
In the new millennium, the issue of global warming gained new urgency
(IPCC 2007, Stern 2008). It became apparent that the task of attaining
‘sustainability’ cannot remain a casual long-term vision, but is instead a time-
bound project, if critical climatic tipping-points are to be avoided. The
international community agreed on the goal of keeping global warming
below 1.5°C by 2100, compared to pre-industrial temperatures (UNFCCC
2015). In order to reach that goal, industrialised countries need to decarbo-
nize their economies almost completely by 2050. Consequently, terms like
low-carbon transition, energy transition or even socio-ecological transforma-
tion started to appear in policy papers on the national and supranational level
and increasingly replace the focus on sustainable development (EC 2011; e.g.
HM Government 2009, UN 2015). The pressure is now on the state to
facilitate and lead these transformative processes (Bäckstrand and Kronsell
2015). It may be too early to speak of a third stage of the environmental state,
but the shifting priority from sustainability as a long-term goal to a time-
bound socio-ecological transition is noticeable.
The state, however, now seems to be hitting the glass ceiling that has already
been present during the sustainable development phase: it can enact only such
measures that do not inhibit economic growth and that are not openly
impinging on the quality of the citizens’ lifeworld. Although the public in
most countries seems to share concerns over climate change and to support
state activities to mitigate it, empirical studies show that support tends to end
where the subjective lifeworld begins and that those social strata with the
highest environmental awareness are at the same times those with the largest
carbon footprint (Meyer 2015, Moser and Kleinhückelkotten 2018). The
measures necessary to complete a low-carbon transition within just three
decades, however, may well necessitate substantial interventions in the life-
world of citizens that could be perceived as restrictive. An ‘imposed’ shift of
dietary habits, modes of transportation, consumer choices and deep-seated
social practices that are all standardly perceived as ‘private’ domains, would
most probably incur massive legitimation and accumulation problems (Barry
and Eckersley 2005, p. 263).
At this stage, the environmental state ﬁnds itself in an actual dilemma: it
needs ﬁnally to deliver on the level of SYS while remaining bound to its
functional imperatives of sustaining economic growth and keeping citizens
happy. In the phase of sustainable development, the state could aﬀord to keep
its focus on LWS (as this is the politically decisive realm) while engaging in
modest and rather ineﬀective strategies of ecological modernization at the
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systemic level. The new transition stage, by contrast, would force the state to
turn around its priorities and to focus on systemic change even if at the
expense of LWS. This, however, is precisely what the state is unable to do by
virtue of its functional structure. The dilemma pushes the state to a continued
and intensiﬁed reliance on strategies of ecological modernization, including
‘ecological-economic stimulus programs’ like the ‘Green New Deal’ (Barbier
2010) in combination with large-scale technological solutions for carbon
capture and storage (CCS) technologies (Bäckstrand et al. 2011) that would
allow for an extension of the lifespan of the fossil age. While this is not the
place to assess these strategies’ prospects of success in any conclusive way, one
may wonder if the strategic options of the state are suﬃcient to meet the
challenge of a comprehensive socio-ecological transition.
In sum, there is something like a dialectic between lifeworld and system
going on, which pushes the state to take more action the more the eﬀects of
systemic unsustainability invade the lifeworld. However, this pushes the state
ever closer against the glass ceiling where its options become ever more limited
as it needs to sustain too many things at once: economic growth, the prosperity
of its citizens and the life support functions of the biosphere. In order to attain
the latter, it would arguably have to let go of the ﬁrst (growth) and radically
redeﬁne what prosperity means (Jackson 2009). This, however, is precisely
what the existing imperative structure prevents.
Conclusion: and the future?
What, then, are plausible trajectories for the future of the environmental
state? Will it be possible to shift or even break that glass ceiling or are we
trapped in a golden cage of unsustainability?
I can think of three speculative answers to these questions, with some
potential overlap between them. First, it is conceivable that the accumulating
negative consequences of systemic unsustainability like more frequent and
devastating forest ﬁres, draughts, ﬂoods, and harvest failures will increasingly
haunt and distress the lifeworld also of environmentally reformed high-
income countries. That way, the decoupling of LWS and SYS, which had
been the major political success of the environmental state, may collapse to
some extent and the state might be pressed to enact more stringent measures
of SYS in order to improve the degrading lifeworld. One should be cautious
with this possibility, however, since a deteriorating lifeworld might primarily
legitimate adaptive instead ofmitigationmeasures, as mitigation will require
ever more radical measures, the deeper we enter the climate crisis. In
addition, once the lifeworld of environmental states deteriorates to such an
extent that the electorate legitimates radical transformative action by the
state, it may well be too late to avert catastrophic climate change.
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A second avenue of thought concerns the nature of the lifeworld and what it
means to ‘improve’ it. Thus, a viable strategy of actionmay be to devise possible
low-carbon transition scenarios that may by themselves be perceived as
improvements of the lifeworld. This includes attempts to disarticulate the
growth imperative and the legitimation imperative by oﬀering visions of life-
world-improvement that do not rely on material growth (Jackson 2009). In
order for this strategy to work, however, it might have to cut that link quite
radically and oﬀer alternative conceptions of work, welfare and social security
(Koch and Mont 2016). For example, it is conceivable that a disarticulation of
the growth and legitimation imperatives would require the abdication of wage
labour as the central organizing principle of the capitalist state (Habermas
1988, Schor 1993, Kallis et al. 2013). Such disarticulation, however, would
mean to remove a central pillar of the capitalist state in that large parts of social
reality would no longer be coordinated by anonymousmarketmechanisms but
repoliticised to become issues of societal decision-making. This would hardly
be compatible with the structures of liberal democracy and necessitate a new,
perhaps more republicanmodel of democracy (Barry 2017, Heidenreich 2018).
Thus, what starts as an innocent reﬂection on ‘alternative lifeworlds’ might
ultimately cascade into the collapse of the modern (capitalist) state’s functional
architecture. While this may turn out to be a necessary condition for anything
like a sustainability transition to happen, its far-reaching consequences may
not be to everybody’s taste.
Lastly, if representative governments ﬁnd themselves in a diﬃcult position
to enact changes that may negatively impinge on accumulation processes and
on citizens’ lifeworlds, then one obvious place to look for a way out is the
search for alternative models of democracy that do not exclusively rely on
representation. Although it seems likely that citizens of any conceivable
model of democracy will be reluctant to deliberately reduce the material-
energetic furnishing of their lifeworld, it is still plausible to assume that citizens
may be willing to support more radical and transformative measures in such
ﬁelds that do not directly impinge on their lifeworld, but that are blocked by
vested interests and accumulation imperatives. Examples would be standards
of production and trade like organic farming, fair trade, the democratic
regulation of what resources are to be allowed in production processes and
so on. That way, controversial resources and production processes could
become subject to deliberative and direct decision-making (Hausknost 2014,
Hammond and Smith 2017), thereby circumventing the legitimation dilemma
of the state. On the other hand, more direct and deliberative forms of decision
making in ﬁelds of socio-ecological transition may undermine policy coher-
ence (Nilsson et al. 2012) and increase the role of ‘populism’ in these ﬁelds
(Beeson 2019, Blühdorn and Butzlaﬀ 2019). Nevertheless, there might be quite
some scope for the development of a more ‘transformative’ model of
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democracy that would be able better than the existing ones to deal with the
inevitable transition of societies to a post-fossil socio-metabolic regime.
In sum, the analysis presented here suggests that the glass ceiling of
transformation is deeply embedded in the very structures of the modern
state. Consequently, the question of its overcoming is inherently entwined
with the fate of the modern state, of democracy and of the mechanisms of
legitimation that stabilise both. Predictions about their future are necessarily
speculative, but rigorous eﬀorts better to understand the conditions of
possibility of a transformative type of democratic state are urgently needed.
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